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Legitimacy or Legitimation? Intensive Analysis of 
Informal Decision-Making Processes of Disaster 
Response after 3.11 Earthquake 
Taro Hirai ∗ 
Abstract: »Legitimität oder Legitimation? Intensive Analyse von informellen Ent-
scheidungsprozessen in Katastrophenhilfe nach dem Fukushima-Erdbeben 2011«. 
In this paper, based on my research about the mutual aids between local govern-
ments after the Great East Japan Disaster (3.11), I try to describe the process in 
which I have collected data based on typical theories and through the interaction 
with informants belonging to local governments in order to discuss the possible 
relationship between data and theories. First of all, I evaluate two recent empiri-
cal studies both of which reached one similar conclusion on one of the typical 
theoretical perspective shared by most researchers on Japanese society after 3.11. 
I name this perspective “divergent theory” because that perspective should gener-
ally point out the divergence of two incompatible forms of norm or narratives on 
political responses to that disaster. Secondly, I describe the data-producing pro-
cess in which I have collected the data about the decision-making of mutual aid 
implementation initially through structured questionnaires which were planned 
based on those static theories and then I modified these data through face-to-
face interviews. Consequently, I have come to interpret these political responses 
to disaster as convergence rather than divergence referring not only to my own 
process-produced data but to Luhmann’s sociological theory which was produced 
by comparative observation of interactions within political processes. Finally, I 
describe reactions of my informants who were introduced to my theoretical in-
terpretation as part of the open-ended process of a reflexive relationship be-
tween data and theories in my research, which should be called “action research.” 
Keywords: Great East Japan earthquake, decision-making process, open-ended 
data, legitimation, Luhmann, action research, Japan, disaster management, 
emergency response, Fukushima. 
1.  Introduction 
In this paper, based on my research about the mutual aids between local gov-
ernments after the Great East Japan Disaster (3.11),1 I try to describe the pro-
                                                             
∗  Taro Hirai, Graduate School of Regional Studies, National University Corporation, Hirosaki 
University, 1 Bunkyo-cho, Hirosaki City, 0368560, Japan; of-hirai@hirosaki-u.ac.jp. 
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cess in which I have related data with theories and to discuss the possible rela-
tionship between data and theories. First of all, I introduce two recent empirical 
studies as typical cases of “static description of the status quo” (Baur and Ernst 
2011, 122): one establishing general theory about public management in disas-
ter situations based on case studies about the governmental response to disaster 
in the United States since 1990; the other testing through historical and com-
parative analysis the hypothesis that the Japanese political system transformed 
after 3.11. In my estimation, one similar conclusion of both studies should be 
regarded as one of the typical theoretical perspectives shared by most of re-
searchers on Japanese society after 3.11. I name this perspective “divergent 
theory” because that perspective should generally point out the divergence of 
two incompatible forms of norm or narratives on the political response to disas-
ter. Secondly, I describe the data-producing process in which I have collected 
the data about the decision-making of mutual aid implementation initially 
through structured questionnaires which were planned based on those static 
theories and then I modified these data through face-to-face interviews. Conse-
quently, I have come to interpret these political responses to disaster as conver-
gence rather than divergence referring not only to my own process-produced 
data (Onaka 2013, 164) but to Luhmann’s sociological theory which was pro-
duced by comparative observation of interactions within political processes. 
Finally, I describe the reactions of my informants who were introduced to my 
theoretical interpretation as part of the reflexive process of relationship be-
tween data and theories in my research. 
2.  Divergent Theory 
Years after 3.11, day by day, we – who are to some extent concerned about 
affected people and areas – cannot but notice the recovery disparities between 
similarly affected areas which have similar socio-economic conditions. One 
may regard it as a failure of response to disaster, but how can we distinguish 
between failure and success? 
One answer is given in a recent study entitled “Dealing with Disaster” by 
Saundra K. Schneider who explores a kind of general evaluation criterion about 
governmental response to natural disaster based on comparative analysis of 
recent cases in the United States. In this book, she says as follows: 
                                                                                                                                
1  This disaster was directly provoked by the magnitude 9.0 undersea megathrust earthquake 
off the coast of Japan on March 11, 2011. The damages have induced the death of about 
16,000 people and caused the loss of over 100 billion US dollars national wealth due to the 
severe accidents in nuclear power plants. From immediately after the outbreak to today, it 
was estimated that the damaged area has received over 100,000 public officials of national 
and local governments and over 1,500,000 volunteers as relief and assistance staff.  
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Stated simply, the size of the gap ultimately determines whether the public 
perceives the government’s disaster relief efforts to be successes or failures. 
[…] It is no exaggeration to say that the gap between bureaucratic norms and 
emergent norms provides an accurate mechanism for identifying and explain-
ing the success or failure of governmental disaster relief efforts. (Schneider 
2011, 78-9) 
During disasters, our regular modes of behaviour are so severely disrupted that 
we not only question the legitimacy of established governmental norms (basis 
of policies and administrative procedures) but also develop new norms and 
behaviour patterns to guide our actions. Schneider names the former “bureau-
cratic norm” and the latter “emergent norm” and she notices the gap between 
these two norms which has been generated inevitably in disaster response. We 
should be careful that this gap never vanishes even if it could diminish infinite-
ly. In other words, bureaucratic norm never changes even though it overlaps 
with emergent norms, and vice versa. In Schneider’s general theory, the legiti-
macy of governmental policies and procedures has never been renewed or 
reconstructed even though fundamentally suspected. 
As Schneider tells, “[n]atural disasters provide a real-world laboratory for 
dealing with extremely trying circumstances. If the government can improve its 
performance here, it may be able to do so elsewhere as well” (Schneider 2011, 
245). Most Japanese are interested in the political response not merely to natu-
ral disaster but also to general issues. In this view point, Richard J. Samuels’ 
“3.11: Disaster and Change in Japan” explores whether the Japanese political 
system could have shifted without a response to 3.11, through the historical 
analysis of the relationships between natural disasters and political-social re-
forms in Japan and the comparative study of recent cases in U.S., China, and 
Japan. Consequently, he exposes the rhetoric of crisis which have infused dem-
ocratic politics, empowered new actors, and stimulated long-awaited if piece-
meal reforms, aroused considerable public protest, and may have pushed the 
policy process in the direction of transparency in many studied cases. Further-
more, he distinguished three narratives in the rhetoric of crisis in Japanese 
political disputes and conflicts after 3.11 as follows: 
As in security and energy, so expectations for post-3.11 change in local ad-
ministration come in three narrative models: one that posits accelerated for-
ward (put it in gear), one that argues for a deepening of extant trends (stay the 
course), and a third that suggests Japan should return to better times past (re-
verse course). (Samuels 2013, 159-60) 
According to Samuels’ analysis of documents and his own interviews about the 
lessons of 3.11 for Japan’s local public administration, the first narrative would 
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be “put it in gear,” either by expanding municipalities2 in the legitimacy of 
efficiency (Samuels names this “supersize me” narrative) or else by focusing 
on local strengths or capacity and building institutions that generate growth 
from the bottom up (he names this “localize me” narrative). In the second nar-
rative, “stay the course,” that local governments had been following for several 
decades, their mutual dependence and solidarity deepen and the centre draws 
back in ways that enhance both local autonomy and policy innovation. The 
final narrative would “reverse course” in order to preserve the local characteris-
tics of the affected areas that 3.11 threatened to destroy. This narrative of 
change builds on, and resonates with, themes of community and vulnerability 
more than with leadership. However, there are so many differences about 
which the local characteristics to preserve that the post-3.11 discourse on local 
government is oriented toward putting it in gear and staying the course.  
In Samuels’ distinction of normative and legitimated narratives, we should 
be attentive to the fact that these rhetoric models are considered as exclusive 
and independent as the distinction of political response norms by Schneider. At 
a closer look, we can point out that these two distinctions are completely con-
trary. But what is important is that when we try to check up on the recent em-
pirical and theoretical study of the relationship between natural disaster and 
social system, we often find that social response to disaster could expose the 
incompatibility of two or three logics or narratives of legitimacy. In my opin-
ion, “divergent theory,” as a type of logic, should be regarded as one of the 
typical case of “theoretical and personal perspectivity” (Baur and Ernst 2011, 
134) of researchers on Japanese society after 3.11. 
3.  Divergence or Convergence? 
Certainly, we feel we can ascribe various and complicated behaviours and 
statements within decisions and plans responding to 3.11, to several exclusive 
logics or narratives of legitimacy, and that is why most researchers working on 
the social situation after 3.11 have adopted the “divergent theory.” However, we 
should not ignore that in respective decisions and plans single option has been 
selected. Namely, it is certain that policy makers have decided and planned by 
overcoming the incompatibility of the several legitimacies. In retrospect, that is 
the reason why I have come to focus the data-producing process in these deci-
sion-making processes. 
                                                             
2  Japanese local governments consist of 47 prefectures as the first level and 1,718 municipali-
ties as the second level of jurisdiction and administrative division. The jurisdictions of pre-
fectures and municipalities are attributed according to the principle of subsidiarity. 
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3.1  The Mutual Aid between Local Governments 
This consideration of policy-making processes has been confirmed in the pro-
cess of my investigation about the mutual aid after 3.11 between local govern-
ments. As Larson (2013, 46) says, except in the rarest cases, contemporary 
local governments across the world will require the assistance of their neigh-
bouring local governments when faced with major disasters and catastrophic 
incidents. This assistance, designated as “mutual aid,” belongs to the classic 
process of cost containment decision making. Typically, contiguous local gov-
ernments develop a process for sharing emergency response assets, thereby 
avoiding the expenses associated with acquiring and maintaining a full-time 
response capacity. Legal agreements should be established between the various 
authorities and private organizations specifying the types of emergency ser-
vices to be provided, and the procedure for requirements. 
Especially, mutual aid has been evaluated as the most innovative form of as-
sistance to affected local governments after 3.11 and possibly the most innova-
tive policy initiative to emerge from the crisis overall (Samuels 2013, 157). The 
mutual aid agreement enshrined in the 1961 Disaster response Basic Law3 was 
reinvented after the Hanshin/Awaji disaster4 in January 1995. Afterward, the 
central government established a system for sharing fire departments, and in 
2006, the National Association of Governors5 developed a mechanism for the 
transfer of officials to disaster-stricken areas. After 3.11, initially based on the 
1961 agreement and later with central government funding, local governments 
that were not affected would house displaced persons, bundle and ship relief 
supplies, provide grants for local volunteer groups and nongovernmental organ-
izations (NGOs), and dispatch large units of their own employees to fill in for 
overwhelmed and, in some cases, missing officials in the affected areas. 
However, as time goes by, the assisting local governments were confronted 
with severe problems. Some local governments found themselves already 
shorthanded at home because of structural fiscal difficulties caused by shifts in 
industrial structure, fiscal capacity gap, population aging and depopulation. 
Citizens of some local governments occasionally resisted the use of their tax 
money to help elsewhere. These problems, aggravated with time, could also be 
                                                             
3  This law changed fundamentally the legal and financial responsibility of disaster response 
from local governments (municipalities and prefectures) to the central government. 
4  By this disaster caused by the 6.9 magnitude earthquake, which damaged one of the biggest 
metropolitan areas of Japan for the first time after the World War II, over 6,000 people lost 
their lives and the long-term economic recession of Japan was triggered beyond recall. From 
the point of view of sociology, it was regarded as the turning point of the emergence of 
volunteerism and charities in contemporary Japanese society on the basis of over 1,300,000 
voluntary staff and about 1.8 billion US dollars donation. 
5  In Japan, after World War II, the Governor is the highest ranking executive of the prefecture 
government. The National Association of Governors is known as one of the most powerful 
lobbying group. 
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considered as latent problems since local governments decided the first imple-
mentation of mutual aid. Hence we should explore the legitimation process of 
mutual aid decisions, rather than estimate the excellent results of mutual aid as 
the evidence of a type of legitimate narrative of political and social reform. 
3.2  Reconstruction of the Researcher’s Perspectives 
First of all, as a member of the nationwide investigation team, in spring of 
2012, I tried to design a questionnaire which inquired nation-wide public offi-
cials of local governments (17/47 prefectures and 496/1718 municipalities) 
about both achievements and resources of the mutual aid. According to the 
“divergent theory,” I set up fundamental distinctions between law-based disas-
ter relief, agreement-based mutual aid, and others, funded by national govern-
ment reimbursement (subsidy), local government’s own tax, donation to local 
government, and so forth, because through these analytical distinctions of legal 
basis and revenue sources, I guessed that we could identify the conflict be-
tween two norms and two or three narratives. In other words, as the first step of 
data-producing about mutual aid, I framed my research question following the 
“divergent theory” as my own perspective. 
However, in winter of 2012, I was struck speechless, as I received from 
those local government officials a bundle of the questionnaires filled in with 
the message “we cannot distinguish legal basis or revenue sources between the 
sequential mutual aids.” This message meant that the “divergent theory” could 
not help sufficiently to approach the decision-making process of the mutual aid 
and also it could not produce the effective data. In a moment I began to inter-
view the officials of several local governments which are situated in Tohoku 
region 6  but have been relatively unaffected. Most local governments have 
requested assistance that was guided to such an extent by constantly and indi-
vidually varying emergent needs in the process of disaster relief response, that 
they have encountered the bureaucratic limits of legal basis and revenue 
sources. After my repeated interviews of local government officials, I gradually 
grasped various ways in which they worked their way out between emergent 
norm and bureaucratic one, which could be distinguished theoretically. 
Informal accounts of some public officials given to me reveal that to over-
come these bureaucratic obstacles, of which the officials have been aware due 
to their emergent norms, the one local government had attributed national gov-
ernment subsidies for other purposes (for example, unemployment policy funds 
were redirected to disaster response) and the other supplemented its original 
tax-revenue shortfall with the donation from the public. At the same time, the 
                                                             
6  This region consists of the northeastern part of the largest island of Japan. The eastern coast 
of this region was swept by the huge tsunami of 3.11 and nowadays the coastal area is still 
suffering from the difficulty to recover from the disastrous damages. 
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informants told me about the context in which they had found out about the 
convergent way of mutual aids. As it were, in Japan, those alternative quasi-
governmental revenue sources as well as monetary charities have been expand-
ing and becoming more visible since the 2000s, when the Japanese could not 
but confront the endless economic decline and liquidation of the stable, regular 
long-term employment, and at the same time notice the necessity and possibil-
ity of enhancing policies for volunteer activities and monetary charities. In 
other words, some officials have satisfied “the request of emergent norm or 
‘stay the course’ narrative” in disaster response with “the bureaucratic norm or 
‘put in in gear’ narrative” by enhancing policy of employment (even if it were 
unstable) and public charity. In respective policies, certainly the gap has re-
mained between logics and narratives of legitimacy, but on the whole, we can 
notice their convergences or reconciliations. 
To sum up, at first, I designed questionnaires which asked the informants to 
add up the mutual aids they had received from each legal basis and revenue 
source, consequently the results of mutual aids themselves were given as dark 
figures by most of the informants who could not indicate formally their various 
informal ways of appropriation and supplement. Based on this failure to pro-
duce data following my own theoretical and personal perspective, through 
some repeated and open-ended interviews with several informants, I could 
produce the data on the mutual aid and grasp the new perspectivity that should 
be called “convergent theory” for the description of decision-making processes 
of mutual aids.  
3.3  Informal Data Collection 
Well then, why cannot we help observing the gap and divergence, as well as 
the successes and failures about 3.11 disaster responses? It is certain that the 
convergences which I was noticed are ad hoc, at a risk of being misunderstood, 
banal (“stay the course”). In other words, the partial and segmental scenes of 
decision-making processes could be seen as divergent situations, but on the 
whole, it should be described as convergent.  
Through my limited and few comparative interviews, it seemed to me that 
these ad hoc convergences would be derived from the local government offi-
cials’ feeling they could legitimise their actions through their experiences or 
careers, having rotated across plural and relevant policy positions and due to 
their contacts with activists involved in the local governments. In short, it 
seems to me that local government officials’ empirical or implicit knowledge is 
crucial. 
Methodologically, I noticed the orientation of theoretical modification, ow-
ing to reaching – after many complications – these inside stories or “data” 
about implicit and informal processes of legitimation. I have tried repeatedly, 
perhaps sometimes irritatingly to point out contradictions in the records and 
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explanations of those officials, while cultivating with the utmost attention a 
relationship of trust with them. In essence, if we pay attention to those informal 
and latent decision-making processes, or if we try to produce data through the 
trust-based interactions with these informants, we can find out that after 3.11 
most Japanese local government officials have tried to reconcile “bureaucratic 
norm” with “emergent norm” or “stay the course narrative” with “put it in gear 
narrative” without awareness of reconciling legitimation. 
4.  Reflective Relationship between Informants and 
Researchers 
4.1  Legitimation of Legitimacy 
I propose to name these informal and latent reconciling legitimation processes 
about mutual aid “legitimation of legitimacy” after Niklas Luhmann’s theoreti-
cal analysis of politics in “Die Politik der Gesellschaft” (2002). He says as 
follows: 
Therefore, it is not without reason that around the middle of the 19th century 
public authority, which can in effect be enforced, was designated as legiti-
mate. But that way, too many options remained open, especially in the century 
of controversial ideologies. Hence, in the hope of finding criteria within the 
concept of legitimacy, we have tied it to established cultural and institutional 
value-relationships. (Luhmann 2002, 122-3)7 
[…] the political system itself must provide its legitimation. This can only 
take place if decisions are legitimized through values. Also, the expression 
“civil religion” cannot distract from the fact that the legitimation of legitimacy 
is a permanent activity of politics nowadays and cannot be shifted on to reli-
gion. (Luhmann 2002, 194)8 
This conceptualization has inspired my reflection on the above-mentioned data-
producing process in which I tried to reconstruct my perspectivity and method 
of the figuration from “divergent theory” to “convergent theory.” As this “legit-
imation of legitimacy” proposition has been well-known as “legitimation 
through procedures” (Habermas 1998, 392; Luhmann 2002, 124), Luhmann 
                                                             
7  „Deswegen hat man nicht ohne Grund um die Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts die staatliche 
Gewalt, die sich faktisch durchsetzen kann, schon deshalb als legitim bezeichnet. Aber damit 
blieben, besonders im Jahrhundert der kontroversen Ideologien, zu viele Optionen offen. 
Deshalb hat man den Begriff der Legitimität in der Hoffnung, darin Kriterien zu finden, an 
kulturell und institutionell etablierte Wertbeziehungen gebunden.“ 
8  „[…] das politische System für seine Legitimierung selbst sorgen muß. Das kann nur durch 
den Wertbezug der Entscheidungen geschehen. Auch die Formel ‚Zivilreligion‘ kann nicht 
davon ablenken, daß die Legitimierung der Legitimität heute eine Dauerbeschäftigung von 
Politik ist und nicht auf Religion abgewälzt werden kann.” 
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also, in a sense, tried to produce the data on decision-making processes not in 
reference to discourses on legitimacy but to procedures which public officials 
had kept in mind. At the same time, I would like to remark the other implica-
tion of “legitimation of legitimacy” in Luhmann’s descriptions: “rejection of 
value-fanaticism (intolerance)” (Luhmann 2002, 124). It means the endless 
process of deliberation for reconciliation between conflict values or value-
based narratives. This concept “rejection of value-fanaticism” seems to me 
more appropriate to the description of informal decision-making of local gov-
ernments about their mutual aid continuation than the concept “legitimation 
through procedures” because procedures in bureaucratic organizations are 
explicit and considered relatively inalterable. 
Moreover, reconsidering the inside stories of informal decision-making pro-
cesses about disaster response, it seems to me that this “rejection of value-
fanaticism” could be also derived from the empirical feeling based on careers 
across the borders of organizational sections or social sectors. In this regard, we 
can notice that this type of informal coordination with formal legitimacies has 
been already described through the concept “double (two-way) cycle” in Luh-
mann’s analysis on the interfaces and interactions between the non-elite public 
and the elite politicians and administrative officials (Luhmann 2002, 264). By 
using this concept, Luhmann tried to describe the gradual emergence of infor-
mal decision-making processes within the political and administrative organi-
zations in the postwar welfare states. According to his insight, these informal 
decision-making processes have relieved the excessive load of formal process-
es in a complementary way rather than being in opposition. If these comple-
mentary manifestations of informal decision-making processes can be ob-
served, we should consider that “convergent theory” and process-oriented 
methodology as effective perspective on the contemporary society which tends 
to develop the characteristics of welfare states.  
4.2  Action Research 
Lastly, following my understanding of Luhmann’s principle about internal 
observation of society, we should pursue that “double (two-way) cycle” be-
tween political practice and academic thinking. In my opinion, these interac-
tions should be heeded by process-oriented methodology as its fourth step: 
“reconstructing the sociogenesis of the figuration” (Baur and Ernst 2011, 134), 
because both informants and researchers should take part in this intertwined 
sociogenesis. These interactions between informants and researchers have been 
approached by the “action research,” which is defined as a participatory pro-
cess concerned with developing practical knowledge in the pursuit of worth-
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while human purposes (Reason and Bradbury 2008, 4)9. At a glance, it can be 
seen as a strange analogy between Luhmann’s theoretical observation and 
practice-oriented researches, but Luhmann himself prospected the possibility of 
these practice-oriented researches, which he called “consultation,” for the de-
scription of the evolution of political practices which was caused by interac-
tions with scholars (Luhmann 2002, 395). As it were, if we wish to describe 
these effects on political practices through “action research,” we can describe 
the open-ended interactions between the politics and academism more suitably 
as the “structural coupling,” which is peculiar to the interaction between sub-
systems in the differentiating of contemporary society (Luhmann 2002, 394).  
From the practice-oriented perspective of “action research,” in the context of 
analysis of decision-making processes of the mutual aid, those concepts, i.e., 
“convergent theory” and “legitimation of legitimacy” should be thrown back 
not only to scholars but also to informants or practitioners. Since those inter-
views in winter of 2012, I have held several meetings with local government 
officials who have been interested in communication with a researcher as me, 
as I have intended to actualize or formalized their implicit knowledge and to 
share that knowledge with as many local governments as possible. For most 
public officials who have taken part in meetings with me, on the one hand, the 
concept of “convergent theory” was regarded as the lesson that the public offi-
cials should utilize experiences or tacit knowledges acquired within other sec-
tions or organizations (especially voluntary organizations); and on the other 
hand, the concept “legitimation of legitimacy” was seen as the principle of use 
of those experiences or tacit knowledges, that is, “legitimacy” should be con-
sidered not as immobile but plastic due to the involvement not only of public 
officials but also of the stakeholders belonging to voluntary organizations 
which have organized gradually after 3.11. 
In fact, after 3.11 the number of non-profit organizations which were estab-
lished by the non-elite public has increased rapidly and levelled off without 
regional differences in Tohoku region,10 which is regarded as one of the most 
traditional community-based society. Consequently, the local government 
officials have begun to acknowledge necessity and possibilities of coordination 
of the different sensitivities on legitimacies of social services between not only 
elite officials but also non-elite staffs of voluntary organizations whose activi-
ties have extended from disaster response to daily health care of the disadvan-
                                                             
9  By their definition, action research seeks to bring together action and reflection, theory and 
practice, in participation with others, in the pursuit of practical solutions to issues of press-
ing concern to people, and more generally the flourishing of individual persons and their 
communities. 
10  The number of non-profit organization of each prefecture in Tohoku region has fallen to 
the range of 400, except for Fukushima Prefecture where myriads of voluntary grassroots 
organizations have risen for the advocacy of the victims of the nuclear power plant acci-
dent. 
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taged. From the perspective of “action research,” I started to promote the shar-
ing of tacit knowledges on coordination of different legitimacies over the 
boundaries not only between the elite and the non-elite but between the experi-
enced and the unexperienced. In my opinion, this sharing of diverse knowledg-
es will also awaken the partiality of their perspectives of researchers and com-
mence the data-producing process based on open-ended data which is open to 
both researchers and informants. 
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